tment of State permanent record ENDORSE EXISTING WARKINGS DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TOP SECRET 5093 Control: RELEASE DENIED PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS Action November 14, 1962 Rec'd: SS 8:43 p.m. FROM: New York info 001Secretary of State transferred to C/FADRC TO: Cat. 5 - Transferred to O/FADRC * with additional access 1781, November 14, -8 - para, s/s 14750 NC: MITCHOFILMED Cat. C - Caption and custody retoined 3 5/S Saviewed by! -PRICRITY -1987 W DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY الأحن CUBA AT MTG WITH SYG THIS MORNING STEVENSON AND MCCLOY GAVE HIM ACCOUNT OF PRESENT STATUS US-SOV NEGOTS. SYG RESPONDED BY REPORTING ON HIS RECENT NEGOTS WITH CUBANS. AND SOVS ON UN VERIFICATION. THANT SAID HE HAD SOUNDED OUT LECHUGA INFORMALLY NOV 8 ON ACCEPTABILITY FIVE LA AMBS IN CUBA for dual purpose of verifying withdrawal offensive weapons and of serving as liaison between un and cuban govt in REGARD TO SOLUTION CUBAN CRISIS. ON NOV 11 LECHUGA INFORMED SYG HIS GOVT'S RESPONSE TO FIRST FUNCTION PROPOSED FOR LA MAG WAS NEGATIVE AND ITS REACTION TO SECOND PROPOSED FUNCTION WAS POSITIVE. WHEN SYG INQUIRED WHETHER CASTRO OBJECTS TO LATIN AMERICANS PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS, LECHUGA REPLIED: IN THE NEGATIVE BUT ADDED THAT HIS GOVT IS UNHAPPY ABOUT ACTION LA COUNTRIES IN DAS ON OCT 23. CONSEQUENTLY ON NOV 12 SYG MADE FORMAL PROPOSAL IN WRIT-ING TO LECHUGA PROPOLING, IN PLACE-LA AMBS, GROUP OF AMBS FROM "NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AFRICA, EUROPE AND LA TO PERFORM SAME TWO FUNCTIONS, I.E., VERIFTCATION AND LIAISON BETWEEN CUBA AND UN. NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED TO THIS SECOND PROPOSAL AND LECHUGA APPEARED TO EXPECT HIS GOVT'S FREPLY WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH ITS REACTION TO FIRST INFORMAL PROPOSAL, THAT IS NEGATIVE ON VERIFICATION AND POSITIVE ON Preparation from this copy is • This copy must be returned to RMOR ANTENDIES no entities a fill of a half assisted ACTION HAME OF OFFICER e office symbol

TOP SECRET

-2- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

SYG CONTINUED THAT, WHILE HE, LIKE US AND USSR, FEELS SC MTG IS UNDESTRABLE AT THIS STAGE, HE NEVERTHELESS FEELS CBLIGA-TION TO REPORT TO SC IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE ALMOST THREE WEEKS HAS ELAPSED SINCE HIS APPEAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN CUBAN CRISIS. HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC NOV 16 FCLLOWING RECEIPT OF CASTRO'S REPLY TO HIS PROPOSAL. BOTH US REPS AND HIS OWN COLLEAGUES (BUNCHE AND LOUTFI) DISCOURAGED IDEA OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC AT THIS POINT WHILE NEGOTS ARE STILL IN FLUID STATE AND SYG APPEARED WILLING TO DELAY.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY HE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN PROPOSING NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN HAVANA SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CASTRO WAS THAT, PARTLY THROUGH THEIR COOD OFFICES, CASTRO MIGHT BE GRADUALLY PULLED OUT OF ALL BLOCS AND INTO MILITARILY NO -ALIGNED POSITION WHICH HE HAD APPARENTLY ASPIRED TO WHEN HE PARTICIPATED IN BELGRADE CONFERENCE LAST YEAR.

THERE ENSURED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ARRANGE-MENTS DURING WHICH STEVENSON- AND MCCLOY ATTEMPTED TO DRAW CLEAR LINE BETWEEN IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFEN-SIVE WEAPONS AND LONGER TERM SAFEGUARDS AGAINST REINT LIDUCTION SUCH WEAPONS INTO CUBA. SYG EMPHASIZED THAT CASTRO INVISTED ON_RECIPROCITY IN REGARD TO ANY MEASURES OF VERIFICATION OR INSPECTION AND THAT HE, THANT, DOUBTED IT VOILD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT ELTHER SHORT OR LONG TERM MEASURES OF THIS KIND WITHOUT RECIPROPAL FEATURES. THERE WAS MENTION OF POSSIBLE INSPECTION SOLELY OF CUBAN EXILE CAMPS IN US AND ELSEWHERE AS QUID PRO QUO FOR VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA. US NEGOTIATORS EMPHASIZED IN LATTER CONNECTION THAT MERY INSPECTION OF VACANT MISSILE SITES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT INSPECTORS MUST HAVE FREEDOM TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF CONCEALED WEAPONS IN CAVES OR ELSEWINAL. AS IU LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS NARASIMHAN SUGGESTED THAT UN COMMISSION. CONSTITUTED FROM NON-ALIGNED AMBS OR OTHERWISE, MIGHT BE CHARGED ON THE ONE HAND WITH ASSURING THAT THERE WAS NO REINTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE YEAPONS AND ON OTHER HAND OF POLICING ASSURANCES A PAINST INVASION OF CUBA BY US AND OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL IT WAS AGREED UN SHOULD FORMULATE IT IN WRITING AND SUBMIT IT TO US FOR STUDY. STEVENSON EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS AND RECALLED THAT THOSE SUGGESTED SO FAR INCLUDE -

TOP SECRET'

-3- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

(1) SOV ASSURANCES OF NON-REINTRODUCTION, (2) CONTINUED US AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, (3) LA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE WITH APPROPRIATE INSPECTION, AND (4) UN INSPECTION AGAINST REINTRODUCTION AND INVASION AS JUST SUGGESTED BY NARASIMHAN. MCCLOY SUGGESTED UN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN CARIBBEAN AS POSSIBLE VARIANT. UN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT WHETHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONE COULD BE ORGANIZED WITHOUT DELAY OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

IN CONCLUSION THERE WAS BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN FINAL SC MTG ON CUBA. THANT SAID POSSIBILITIES HE HAD MENTIONED TO SOVS WERE (1) TRADITIONAL SC FORM OF RES, (2) DECLARATIONS BY PARTIES CONCERNED, IN WHICH CASE US STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED BY OAS, WHICH MIGHT BE REPORTED TO SC BY CHILE AND VENEZUELA, (3) JOINT PROTOCOL AGREED BEFORE SC MTG, (4) COMBINATION OF RES AND DECLARATIONS WHEREBY RES MIGHT WELCOME SOME POINTS IN DECLARATIONS AND TAKE NOTE OF OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION VIEW WAS GENERALLY EXPRESSED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON EITHER PROTOCOL OR RES AND THAT JOINT DECLARATIONS WOULD BE SUPPLIED SOLUTION. STEVENSON POINTED OUT THAT US IS OF COURSE NOT IN POSITION TO PREDICT WHAT OAS ACTION MIGHT BE. WE WOULD SUPPOSE OAS MIGHT, AFTER SOVS HAD COMPLIED WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS, REPEAL ITS RES OF OCT 23 BUT WE CANNOT YET KNOW WHAT OTHER ACTION CAS MIGHT TAKE.

STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 11/14/62, 9 PM.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee Per Mr. Pogers 11/14/CWO-W